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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Advances in technology and the budding market for health information have lead to an 
increasing potential for abuse and even harm to an individual and his or her privacy.  Ideally, the 
computerization of health records facilitates and promotes communications between health care 
providers.  The expected result of the shift in recent years is to increase the quality of care 
provided by improving the efficiency with which information can be accumulated, processed and 
communicated.  In reality, the change from paper records to electronic has brought to light gaps 
in the current statutory and regulatory framework, absence of clear ruling and misunderstanding 
of the potential dangers that lurk in the shadows of the secondary health information market. 
 The federal right of privacy to be discussed further arises from federal statute.  The 
primary statute applicable to the health care privacy context is HIPAA.
1
  To account for the 
advances in technology and advances in the arsenal of abusers of the technology, Congress 
should amend the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) to cover 
reputational intermediaries as “covered entities”.  States have tried unsuccessfully to protect 
health patients and those patients’ individual health information via regulation and state statutes.2  
If a state is to act in the future, it must do so in a manner that fits within the narrow guidelines set 
forth by the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Sorrell v. IMS (cite).3  If left to the control of 
reputational intermediaries
4
 the security of individual consumer’s personal health information 
(“PHI”) is at risk.  Under the current regulatory scheme, most consumers have little to no 
knowledge that massive profiles exist that encompass nearly every aspect of the individual’s 
                                                 
1
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) 
2
 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011) 
3
 Id. 
4
 This paper focuses primarily on firms like Acxiom and IntelliScripts as prime examples of how 
reputational intermediaries take advantage of consumers and the lack of regulatipprofit.profit. 
 3 
health and habits.   Even if they know that the files exist, they can do little to prevent or direct 
the sale, use, misuse and abuse of access to the information.  As a result, Congress’ should 
devise an amendment to HIPAA and the amendment should include an accounting of when their 
information is disclosed (especially to entities outside the individual’s health care provider); a 
private right of action for violation under the statute and should consider a provision that requires 
the individual’s informed consent to sell the profile. 
 No regulatory framework is perfect but the one that is in place at the current time is 
simply inadequate.  The computerization of health information is an idea motivated by the 
improvement of health quality.  Included in the assessment of health care quality is how the care 
is being delivered, tracked and transferred.  The consumer’s knowledge of the care and how their 
records are being maintained should also be an aspect of that quality that Congress begins to pay 
more attention to.  Increasing consumer knowledge of the markets that exist, the methods that are 
used and the potential abuses that occur help prevent consumer fraud; ethical dilemmas 
discussed herein and generally increase the efficiency and quality of health care the consumers 
are receiving. 
II. THE PROBLEM: Privacy Threats: They Know What’s In Your Closet 
 In 2008, Chad Turhune published just one example of how the unregulated market for 
consumer health information is a dangerous and unreasonably invasive industry.  “Privacy and 
consumer advocates warn the information can easily be misinterpreted or knowingly misused.  
At a minimum, the practice is adding another layer of anxiety to a marketplace that many 
consumers already find baffling,” Turhune wrote.  He quoted independent insurance agent in 
Overland Park, Kansas Jay Horowitz saying, “and it’s making it harder to find insurance for 
 4 
people.”5  Isn’t it troubling that an insurance company can reject applicants based solely on the 
individual’s record of prescription medication without the opportunity to dispute or explain the 
record? 
Walter and Paula Shelton of Gilbert, Louisiana were placed in that very situation when 
they applied for insurance from Humana, a large insurer in Louisville, Kentucky.
6
  “They were 
rejected by the large Louisville insurer after a company representative pulled their drug profiles 
and questioned them over the telephone about prescriptions for Walter and his wife for blood-
pressure and anti-depressants.”7  Where consumers like Walter and Paula are confronted with 
this information the natural reaction is to provide explanation for why the individual’s 
prescription record should not preclude their ability to obtain insurance.  Walter tried to explain 
that his wife had been prescribed blood-pressure medicine as an anti-inflammatory for her 
swollen ankles, and she had been prescribed anti-depressant medication as a sleep aid.  At the 
time, both were considered common “off-label” treatment (especially the latter for menopausal 
women).
8
  Walter pleaded with the Humana insurance representative to no avail, as both Walter 
and Paula were denied coverage and were uninsured at the time the article was written in 2008.
9
 
The dangers are potentially severe and the concerns are understandable for consumers 
like Walter and Paula.  They do not know if there is something in their prescription history, or 
some other form of data that has been collected, that can and will be used against them when 
applying for insurance coverage.  Furthermore, the practice is unnerving because the 
consumer/patient is being penalized for taking medication that was likely prescribed by their 
                                                 
5
 http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-07-22/they-know-whats-in-your-medicine-cabinet 
6
 Id. 
7
 Id. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. 
 5 
treating doctor.  It causes unfair consequences to punish a patient for taking prescribed medicine 
without informing them that their decision to take the medication may or may not preclude them 
from gaining insurance coverage in the future.  If insurers are using the data to deny coverage, it 
leads to a logical inference that they are also using the data to estimate costs for applicants.  Few 
consumers have much knowledge of the insurance market, and it is unlikely that many have the 
wherewithal to recognize when and why their premiums are being increased for reasons 
unknown to the average customer.  At the very least, one should be informed that their 
prescription record can be acquired by insurance companies and may cause hesitation and 
investigation when the consumer applies for coverage.  The purpose of the health care reform 
supported by President Obama’s administration is to improve access to and the delivery of health 
care services for all individuals, particularly low income, underserved, uninsured, minority, 
health disparity, and rural populations.
10
  That purpose is sabotaged by the routine practice of 
denying applicants on the basis of what may be unreasonable assumptions guided by records 
with no room for explanation or dispute.  “Most consumers and even many insurance agents are 
unaware that Humana, UnitedHealth Group, Aetna, Blue Cross plans, and other insurance giants 
have ready access to applicants’ prescription histories.”11 
Some of the potential problems posed by the existence and accessibility of  massive 
consumer profiles were discussed by Preston N. Thomas in Little Brother’s Big Book: The Case 
for a Right of Audit in Private Databases.  “Whoever controls our data can decide whether we 
can get a bank loan, on an airplane or into a country.  Or what sort of discount we get from a 
merchant, or even how we’re treated by costumer support.  A potential employer can, illegally in 
                                                 
10
 PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, PL 111-148, March 23, 2010, 
124 Stat 119 
11
 http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-07-22/they-know-whats-in-your-medicine-cabinet 
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the U.S., examine our medical data and decide whether or not to offer us a job.”12  Thomas 
agrees that there exists an obvious potential for harm and acknowledged that the current 
framework for keeping the harms in check is flawed and inadequate.
13
  “Many of America’s 
most important privacy protections do not apply to commercial data brokers… and they [data 
brokers] are generally unknown to society as a whole.
14
 
a. Medical Records Are Regulated by HIPAA 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) was passed on 
August 21, 1996 as part of Congress’ response to the need for wide-reaching reform of the health 
care industry.
15
  Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA is entitled "Administrative Simplification," and 
states as its purpose to “improve the Medicare program under title XVIII of the Social Security 
Act, the medicaid program under title XIX of such Act, and the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the health care system, by encouraging the development of a health information system through 
the establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of certain health 
information.” 16  HIPAA focuses on the continuous transition to electronic health information.  
                                                 
12
 Id. Citing, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Our Data, Ourselves, WIRED, May 15, 2008, http:// 
www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/05/securitymatters_ 0515 
[hereinafter Our Data, Ourselves]; 153 CONG. REC. S1635-38 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2007) 
(statements of Sens. Specter & Feingold) (introducing the Personal Data Privacy and Security 
Act of 2007). 
13
 “As evidenced by the staggering depth and breadth of largely unregulated data collection, the 
current legal regime is inadequate for the task of addressing the complex relationship between an 
individual, his or her information, and the company that holds it. Id. 
14
 Id. Citing Nicole Duarte, Commercial Data Use by Law Enforcement Raises Questions about 
Accuracy, Oversight, CARNEGIE-KNIGHT INITIATIVE ON THE FUTURE OF JOURNALISM 
EDUCATION, Aug. 16, 2006, http:// 
newsinitiative.org/story/2006/08/16/commercial_data_use_by_law. 
15
 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133 (2004) 
16
 HIPAA § 261; 110 Stat. 2021; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d note. This subtitle consists of §§ 261 
through 264 of the Act. Section 262 amends Title XI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1301 et seq., to add a Part C, entitled "Administrative Simplification," with sections 1171 to 
 7 
Congress authorized the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate 
regulations. 
17
  Collectively, the regulations are known as “The Privacy Rule”.18 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes national standards to protect individuals’ medical 
records and other personal health information and applies to health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain health care transactions 
electronically.  The Rule requires appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of personal health 
information (PHI), and sets limits and conditions on the uses and disclosures that may be made 
of such information without patient authorization. The Rule also gives patients rights over their 
health information, including rights to examine and obtain a copy of their health records, and to 
request corrections.
19
  The regulations define PHI as information that: 
(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, 
employer, or health care clearinghouse; and 
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health 
or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an 
individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision 
of health care to an individual; and 
(i) That identifies the individual; or 
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the 
information can be used to identify the individual. 
The Privacy Rule requires covered entities to take the following 
actions with regard to protected health information: 
(1) Provide individuals with notice and certain rights regarding 
their protected health information; 
(2) Limit the use and disclosure of protected health information; 
(3) Obtain authorization from an individual to use or disclose 
protected health information; 
(4) Contract with service providers to provide assurances regarding 
proper use, appropriate disclosure and appropriate safeguards; 
(5) Implement policies and procedures to protect protected health 
information including: appointing a privacy officer, training the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1179, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d through § 1320d–8. Section 263 amends the Public 
Health Service Act, at 42 U.S.C.A. § 242k(k). 
17
45 C.F.R. § 160 et. seq. 
18
 Id. 
19
 http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html 
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Business Associate's workforce, implementing safeguards and a 
complaint process. 
The Privacy Rule also permits limited uses and disclosures of 
protected health information, including disclosures to the patient 
and disclosures and uses related to payment, treatment, and health 
care operations.
20
 
 
Under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the general rule pertaining to 
the disclosure of protected health information is that a covered entity may not use or disclose 
protected health information without a written authorization from the individual or, alternatively, 
the opportunity for the individual to agree or object.
21
  However, HIPAA’s provisions 
prohibiting disclosure of individually identifiable health information did not create private cause 
of action; the statute did not contain any language conferring privacy rights upon specific class 
of persons, but rather focused on regulating persons with access to individuals' health 
information, and HIPAA merely created specific means of enforcing the statute.
22
  HIPAA’s 
coverage is limited to “covered entities”, which is a term defined by section 160.103 of title 45, 
Code of Federal Regulations as “health plans, health care clearinghouses and health care 
providers who transmit any health information in electronic form in connection with health care 
transactions covered by HIPAA.”23  Thus, HIPAA does not prohibit non-covered entities from 
disclosing protected health information (PHI), furthermore, there are exceptions that permit 
covered entities to disclose PHI without obtaining the authorization from the patient first.
24
  
 
                                                 
20
 Christopher R. Smith (FNd1), Somebody's Watching Me: Protecting Patient Privacy in 
Prescription Health Information, 36 Vt. L. Rev. 931, 948-49 (2012) 
21
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 101(a) et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1181 et seq.; 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508, 164.510. Isidore Steiner, DPM, PC v. Bonanni, 292 Mich. 
App. 265, 807 N.W.2d 902 (2011). 
22
 Social Security Act, § 1177(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A § 1320d–6(a). University of Colorado 
Hosp. v. Denver Pub. Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Colo. 2004). 
23
 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103 
24
 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501 
 9 
b. Reputational Intermediaries Are Not Covered by HIPAA 
 As a result of the narrow scope of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, Firms like Acxiom and 
IntelliScripts can create medical reputations of individuals using data not covered by HIPAA or 
regulated by the Federal Trade Commission.  These firms are also referred to as “reputational 
intermediaries”.  Acxiom started in 1969 as a small company with relatively little technology and 
the goal of amassing information on voters and consumers for direct marketing.
25
  Today, 
Acxiom has detailed entries for more than 190 million people and 126 million U.S. households, 
including approximately 500 million active consumers worldwide.
26
  The company’s 23,000 
servers, which are located in Little Rock, Arkansas collect and analyze more than 50 trillion data 
transactions per year.
27
   
Natasha Singer of the New York Times is familiar with Acxiom’s operations and stated 
in a 2012 interview, “If you are an American adult, the odds are that it knows things like your 
age, race, sex, weight, height, marital status, education level, politics, buying habits, household 
health worries, vacation dreams and more.”  Companies like Acxiom sells this wealth of 
information to anyone willing to bid the most for the information and use it to market 
specifically and directly to consumers.  In 2011, Acxiom made a reported profit of $77.26 
million.
28
  IntelliScripts provides consumer’s personal drug profiles to insurers.  Insurers can use 
IntelliScripts to gather prescription information in real time and then review an online report.
29
  
                                                 
25
 What Is Acxiom Corp, And How Does It Know Your Mother's Maiden Name?, 2012 WLNR 
13055499 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 http:// www.milliman.com/expertise/healthcare/products-tools/intelliscript 
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IntelliScripts says it sells prescription data to more than 75 health, life, and long-term-care 
insurance companies. Milliman, a large Seattle consulting firm, acquired the company in 2005.
30
 
Neither IntelliScripts nor Acxiom are covered entities, therefore do not fall within the 
purview of HIPAA nor regulations promulgated to enforce HIPAA.  The purpose of these firms 
is clearly marketing and not the provision of health care, thus it is uncontested that these entities 
do not constitute covered entities.  According to HIPAA, Covered entities include health plans, 
health care clearinghouses and health care providers who transmit any health information in 
electronic form in connection with health care transactions covered by HIPAA.
31
  The absence of 
rules and regulations gives firms like IntelliScripts and Acxiom practically free reign to 
accumulate troves of information and do with it what they please.  All the while, consumers that 
may be offended at the thought of their personal information being dispersed may have no 
understanding of the secondary market for their health information; much less would any 
consumer have reason to believe massive profiles exist on nearly every American adult as 
mentioned above.  The market created for pharmaceutical companies, by reputational 
intermediaries causes unfair surprise to consumers, an invasion of privacy of the American 
people and a lack of transparency in an inherently secretive industry. 
VI. Current Regulatory Approach 
a. Data Brokers 
“Data brokers are companies that collect personal information about consumers from a 
variety of public and non-public sources and resell the information to other companies.  In many 
ways, these data flows benefit consumers and the economy; for example, having this information 
about consumers enables companies to prevent fraud.  Data brokers also provide data to enable 
                                                 
30
 http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-07-22/they-know-whats-in-your-medicine-cabinet 
31
45 F.F.R. §§ 160.103 
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their customers to better market their products and services.”32  “Recent amendments to the 
FCRA have precluded states from enacting legislation that would offer more comprehensive 
privacy protections.”33  “The FCRA defines a consumer reporting agency and what activities are 
covered under its provisions.  However, these provisions are written is such a way that data 
brokers are able to define themselves out of the FCRA's grasp.”34 
Logan Danielle Wayne authored a comment entitled, “The Data-Broker Threat: 
Proposing Federal Legislation to Protect Post-Expungement Privacy” and discussed why state 
statutes are inadequate to protect consumers from the potential abuses inherent in the data broker 
industry.  “Because data brokers maintain and distribute records throughout the nation [state 
legislation] is inadequate.” 35  While Wayne’s comment focuses on data brokers in the criminal 
context, the same can be said for brokers that amass consumer’s health information.  Unless all 
50 states enacted comprehensive legislation simultaneously, one (or even several) state’s effort 
would be insufficient.  Similarly, “the data brokers are not in privity of contract with users, 
therefore, users cannot sue them on a contract theory, and thus third-party entities have little 
incentive to protect, or even ensure the accuracy of, personal data,” compiled in consumer 
profiles.
36
  For those reasons, state law does not provide the consumer protection desired, and 
federal legislation focused on furthering consumer protection in the health context is ideal. 
 
 
                                                 
32
 FTC Website 
33
 WestlawDoc1358 (citing Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection, 2006 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 357, 380 (2006).) 
34
 WESTLAW DOC 
35
 WESTLAW DOC102 JCRLC 253 
36
 WESTLAW DOC 18 COMLCON 155 (citing Marcy E. Peek, Beyond Contract: Utilizing 
Restitution to Reach Shadow Offenders and Safeguard Information Privacy, in SECURING 
PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 137 (Anu-pam Chander et al. eds., 2008). 
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b. FTC Approach 
 The Federal Trade Commission’s attempts to close the gap in consumer protectionism 
include the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which promotes the accuracy, fairness, 
and privacy of information in the files of consumer reporting agencies. 
37
  The scope of the act 
includes agencies that sell information about medical records such as Acxiom and 
IntelliScripts.
38
  According to the act, consumers must be notified if information in their file is 
used against them to deny an application for credit, employment, or insurance and must supply 
the consumer with the name, address and telephone number of the agency that provided the 
information.
39
  Furthermore, the consumer may request any and all information contained in the 
files of a consumer reporting agency, and the request will be granted free of charge in certain 
circumstances.
40
 
The statute seeks to address Paula and Walter Sherman’s circumstances in which an 
individual’s personal file is incomplete and/or inaccurate.  In such cases, the individual is 
supposed to have the right to dispute the information and if successful the consumer-reporting 
agency must correct or delete the disputed content. 
41
  “If a consumer reporting agency, or, in 
some cases, a user of consumer reports or a furnisher of information to a consumer reporting 
agency violates the FCRA, you may be able to sue in state or federal court.”42  However, FCRA 
fails to provide individuals with information as to the extent of their profile that has been 
                                                 
37
 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 
38
 FCRA RIGHTS SUMMARY 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
 13 
distributed and to whom the profile has been released. This gap fails to protect one from 
‘downstream sale of his nonfinancial personal information.’”43 
 The FCRA aims to tackle the concerns of consumers worried about the accumulation and 
misuse of PHI, internet browsing history, purchase history, etc.  Commercial data brokers, 
however, are not subject to the limitations of the FCRA, as they are not considered credit-
reporting agencies. 
44
  Prior to the FCRA, insurance companies added boilerplate language in the 
fine print of their applications to comply with the privacy provisions of HIPAA. 
45
  With the 
implementation of FCRA, the FTC has merely required firms like IntelliScripts to tell insurers of 
the consumer rights discussed in the paragraph above so that the insurers could pass the 
appropriate information along to their customer beneficiaries.
46
  What comfort does this provide 
to those being insured?  The following discussion illustrates why the approach taken by the 
Federal Trade Commission via the Federal Credit Reporting Act is an inadequate protection of 
consumer privacy and does not protect the average consumer/patient from the unfair surprise and 
potential hardship that results as a consequence of their information being misused. 
c. FTC v. IntelliSripts 
On February 6, 2008 the Federal Trade Commission took action in hopes of initiating a 
shift towards greater consumer protection.  The FTC filed a complaint against IntelliScripts (and 
parent corporation Milliman, Inc.) alleging that IntelliScripts violated the FCRA by keeping 
                                                 
43
 Sarah Ludington, Reigning in the Data Traders: A New Tort for the Misuse of Personal 
Information, 66 Md. L. Rev. 140, 146 (2006) 
44
 Id. 
45
 http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-07-22/they-know-whats-in-your-medicine-cabinet 
46
 Id. 
 14 
consumers from discovering the exchanges of consumer profiles that occurred between 
IntelliScripts and insurance company purchasers.
47
  
Section 603(d) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act defines a consumer report.
48
 In the FTC’s 
complaint against IntelliScripts, the FTC claimed that the medical profile generated by 
IntelliScripts constituted a consumer report under the act because “it bears on a consumer’s 
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living, which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or 
in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing a consumer’s eligibility for credit or 
insurance.” 49  As a result, the FTC then argued that IntelliScripts regularly furnished these 
reports to third parties in exchange for money by way of interstate commerce making it a 
“consumer reporting agency”50 as defined in Section 603(f) of the FCRA.51  Arguing that the 
profiles constituted consumer reports; therefore that IntelliScripts acted as a consumer-reporting 
agency, brought IntelliScripts’ business model within the gambit of FTC enforcement of the 
FCRA.  
Section 607(d) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1681e(d), requires that any consumer reporting agency provide, to 
any person to whom it provides a consumer report; a “Notice To 
Users of Consumer Reports: Obligations of Users Under the 
FCRA,” the required content of which is set forth in 16 CFR 698, 
Appendix H. Respondent has failed and continues to fail to provide 
                                                 
47
  Complaint at 2, In the Matter of Milliman, Inc., (2007) (Case No. 062-3189)  
48
 “Any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting 
agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, 
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be 
used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the 
consumer’s eligibility for: credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes. 15 U.S.C. §1681a(d) 
49
 Complaint at 2, In the Matter of Milliman, Inc., (2007) (Case No. 062-3189)  
50
 Section 603(f) 15 U.S.C. §1681a(f) 
51
 Id. 
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this notice to insurance companies that purchase medical profiles 
generated by IntelliScripts.
52
 
 
IntelliScripts did not comply with the notice aforementioned notice requirement, and 
subsequently entered into the settlement agreement mentioned above. The FTC and 
IntelliScripts came to a settlement agreement
53
 and, unfortunately, the Commission “merely 
required disclosure if prescription information causes denial of coverage or some other adverse 
action; the agency imposed no penalties.”54  Thus, consumers and the federal government are 
moving forward solely with the assurances from MedPoint and IntelliScripts that they are now 
complying with the Commission’s instructions.  There are no safeguards in place to assure that 
insurers are complying with the disclosure and notice requirements set forth by the settlement 
agreement and therefore no assurance that consumers being insured are being notified when the 
medical information gathered by reputational intermediaries and data brokers is influencing 
insurers decisions to accept or deny applicants. 
d. FTC Investigation 
 On December 18, 2012, the Federal Trade Commission issued nine orders for 
information to analyze the data broker industry’s collection and use of consumer data.  The 
orders required the companies to provide the FTC with more comprehensive details about their 
practices including how they collect and use data about consumers that they compile.  “The 
agency will use the information to study privacy practices in the data broker industry.”55  The 
investigation followed a report dispersed by the FTC earlier in the year that set guidelines for 
data brokerage companies to follow to achieve best practices, “based on the concepts of privacy 
                                                 
52
 Complaint at 2, In the Matter of Milliman, Inc., (2007) (Case No. 062-3189)  
53
 Agreement Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of Milliman, Inc., (2007) (Case No. 062-
3189) 
54
 http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-07-22/they-know-whats-in-your-medicine-cabinet 
55
 http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/12/databrokers.shtm 
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by design, consumer control, and increased transparency for the collection and use of consumer 
data.”56   The report coupled with the demand for information reflects some of the privacy 
concerns discussed above.  “Consumers are often unaware of the existence of data brokers as 
well as the purposes for which they collect and use consumers’ data.  This lack of transparency 
also means that even when data brokers offer consumers the ability to access their data, or 
provide other tools, many consumers do not know how to exercise this right.”57 
 Data brokerage firms and reputational intermediaries should closely monitor the FTC’s 
recent focus on consumer protectionism.  The agency’s actions signify an intention to hold 
companies like IntelliScripts, Acxiom and the nine companies listed in the FTC order, 
accountable for their failures to maintain transparent practices while keeping consumers 
informed about the depth and content of profiles that exist containing their individual 
information.  Specifically, “the FTC will use the responses it receives to prepare a study and to 
make recommendations on whether, and how, the data broker industry could improve its privacy 
practices.”58  While there are currently no laws directly on point to govern these issues, a federal 
regulatory framework is discussed below and the FTC commissioner will probably continue to 
put pressure on these companies to improve transparency and better business practices. 
IV. PROPOSED REGULATION 
 In general, Congress has the power to regulate the channels of commerce and all things 
in, of or about interstate commerce.
59
  The purchasing and/or sale of consumer profiles created 
                                                 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Original authority for commerce power is derived from Article I, Section Eight, Clause Three 
of the United States Constitution, which provides inter alia that Congress shall have the power to 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, 
cl. 3. However, that power has been interpreted by the judiciary to include the power to regulate 
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by reputational intermediaries and data brokers across state lines are clearly part of interstate 
commerce.    Thus, Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate the data broker industry 
under the Commerce Clause, and doing so would help create a uniform, clear and predictable 
regulatory scheme for consumers and health professionals alike. 
a. Cover Reputational Intermediaries Under HIPAA 
 In the context of reputational intermediaries, one possible improvement to the current 
regulatory framework is to make reputational intermediaries covered entities under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.  As the number of entities capable of accessing 
patient health information increases, the risk of security breaches, re-identification and risk of 
abuse of the privilege to collect and disseminate personal health information increases.  An 
attempt to alleviate some of consumer’s concerns in this context should include an expanded 
definition of “covered entities” under HIPAA.  If HIPAA’s definition of covered entities is 
broadened to include reputational intermediaries, the Department of Health and Human Services 
will have the authority as a regulatory body to tighten the free flow of patient health information 
(such as prescription history) by and from companies like IntelliScripts and Acxiom.  Practically, 
the regulation listing the covered entities already in place under HIPAA
60
 could add, “and any 
private entity that accumulates and/or disseminates PHI for the purpose of earning a profit”.  
Practically speaking, that would probably provide very little change in the practices in place 
today.  As mentioned above, there are numerous exceptions that allow covered entities to 
disclose PHI without disclosure to, or consent from, the patient-consumer. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the channels of interstate commerce, all things that fall within interstate commerce, and those 
things that substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1938); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (in, of, and 
about interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (channels of interstate 
commerce).  
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To have a meaningful effect on the industry and the protection of patient’s health 
information, the requirements for covered entities as well as the penalties for failure to comply 
with the regulations must also be revisited.  For example, the proposed regulations should 
include an accounting of disclosures by covered entities.  When an individual’s PHI is disclosed 
or viewed by a party previously not privy to that information, an accounting of the disclosure 
should be made to the patient.  Doing so will put the onus on the patient to monitor their own 
information, while adding mere administrative costs to the entities that are in possession of the 
PHI to begin with.  Furthermore, if an entity in possession of an individual’s information wishes 
to sell it to a data brokerage company, or other interested entity, they may do so only with the 
consent of the patient.  This requirement will naturally: improve the transparency of the data 
brokerage/reputational intermediary industries; increase consumer knowledge of the personal 
profiles that have been accumulated over time and provide for greater individual control over 
those profiles.  The consumer’s knowledge of the care and how their records are being 
maintained should also be an aspect of that quality that Congress begins to pay more attention to. 
b. IMS v. Sorrell 
 “When physicians prescribe medications to patients, pharmacies are under the duty to 
track certain prescriber-specific data by law.  Unbeknownst to patients, and often to doctors 
themselves, the pharmacies sell this precious commodity to data mining companies that analyze 
and format the information for the pharmaceutical industry.” 61   Data miners are usually 
responsible for analyzing the data for pharmaceutical companies so the pharmaceutical industry 
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 Isabelle Bibet-Kalinyak, A Critical Analysis of Sorrell v. Ims Health, Inc.: Pandora's Box at 
Best, 67 Food & Drug L.J. 191, 195 (2012). 
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can focus their marketing efforts and target patients and doctors based on the prescribing habits 
of physicians.
62
 
 Pharmacies sell “prescriber-identifying information to data miners, “who produce reports 
on prescriber behavior and lease their reports to pharmaceutical manufacturers.” 63  
Pharmaceutical companies then employ “detailers” to focus marketing efforts and increase sales 
based on the information discovered from the prescriber-identifying information.
64
  Between 
2006 and 2010, twenty-six states proposed legislation that would limit the use of PI data for 
commercial/marketing purposes.
65
  In 2007, Vermont passed the Confidentiality of Prescription 
Information Act, which required among other things that records containing a doctor’s 
prescribing practices not be sold or used for marketing purposes unless the doctor consented.
66
  
Specifically, the law provided: 
A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic 
transmission intermediary, a pharmacy, or other similar entity shall 
not sell, license, or exchange for value regulated records 
containing prescriber-identifiable information, nor permit the use 
of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information 
                                                 
62
 Data mining is defined as “the process of discovering interesting patterns in databases that are 
useful in decision making.” Indranil Bose & Radha K. Mahapatra, Business Data Mining - A 
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involved in the business of collecting, analyzing, and reselling that information. Id. The three 
data-mining companies who filed the initial lawsuit against Vermont, Maine, and New 
Hampshire are IMS Health, Inc., SDI (formerly Verispan LLC), and Source Healthcare Analytics 
Inc., a division of Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. Brief for Respondents at 1 Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 1149043 at 1. For a thorough review of 
pharmaceutical companies' use PI information and its effect on patients, see David Orentlicher, 
Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patient's Interests, 38 J.L. Med. & Ethics 74 
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for marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the 
prescriber consents as provided in subsection (c) of this section. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall 
not use prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or 
promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consents as 
provided in subsection (c) of this section.
67
 
 
 Thus, the law “limited, but did not prohibit, the purchase and sale of PI data used to 
promote the marketing of prescription drugs.  If the prescriber consented to the sale or use of the 
PI data, the restriction would not apply.  Further, the law contained a number of exceptions to the 
restriction, including use for scientific research, compliance issues, pharmacy reimbursement, 
and other purposes provided by law.”68  Three Vermont data miners, IMS Health Inc., SDI and 
Source Healthcare Analytics Inc., and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, a 
national association of brand-name drug manufacturers contended that the Vermont statute above 
violated their freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
69
  
In response, Vermont argued “its prohibitions safeguard medical privacy and diminish the 
likelihood that marketing will lead to prescription decisions not in the best interests of parents or 
the State.”70  Essentially, Vermont attempted to combat the very issues discussed throughout this 
paper on their own.  “Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing; however, is a form of 
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  As a consequence, 
Vermont’s statute must be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.”71  The First Amendment to 
the U. S. Constitution guarantees that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
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press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.
72
  The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied 
relief.  However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding 
that the law violated the First Amendment by restricting the speech of the companies without 
adequate justification. 
73
 
 Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, Joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito and Sotomayor.
74
  The majority held that the law violated 
the First Amendment and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
75
  Firstly, the court 
found that the Vermont statute placed content and speaker based restrictions on speech.  
Although that finding was not per se fatal for the state statute, the result is that the statute could 
only succeed if it satisfied a heightened judicial scrutiny.
76
  The majority rejected Vermont’s 
contention that the law was a commercial regulation and not a regulation of speech on the 
grounds that the law imposed more than an incidental burden on speech.
77
  Thus, the Court 
moved on to the analysis of whether the Vermont statute met the heightened judicial scrutiny.  
“To sustain the targeted, content-based burden the law imposes on protected expression, 
Vermont must show at least that the statute directly advances a substantial governmental interest, 
and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest.”78  Vermont unsuccessfully argued that the 
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law was necessary to protect medical privacy, physician confidentiality and maintain the 
integrity of the doctor-patient relationship and to achieve improved public health care.
79
  The 
Court reasoned that “the state seeks to achieve its policy objectives through the indirect means of 
restraining certain speech by certain speakers,” which is an impermissible restriction under the 
First Amendment.
80
  Vermont’s statute attempted to stifle the use of particular information 
(prescriber-identifying information) for the purposes of being sold or used in connection with 
marketing (speech).  However, the Court made a suggestion for future lawmakers stating, “if 
Vermont’s statute provided that prescriber-identifying information could not be sold or disclosed 
except in narrow circumstances then the State might have a stronger position.”81 
 Practically speaking, the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell prohibits state statutes 
focused on data mining, data brokerage companies and reputational intermediaries alike.  The 
court will likely find that such statutes discriminate against the content and speakers in these 
industries and should be held to be a violation of the First Amendment.  Furthermore, the Court’s 
decision will not be limited to prescriber-identifying information.  The decision will likely 
govern all information disclosure because the court treated the information found in the patient 
profiles no different from any other type of commercial speech. 
As a result, it is clear that similar state action is not a viable alternative for protecting the 
privacy of patient PHI.  However, the Court clearly left a path for lawmakers to follow in order 
to narrowly tailor future legislation to the legitimate and compelling interests of the state and 
thereby overcome a heightened judicial scrutiny that these laws will certainly face in the future.  
The Sorrell majority did not address whether the government may limit or prohibit the disclosure 
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of data to purely protect personal privacy.  The statute in Vermont allowed the Court to avoid 
this question because it only restricted the use of data for particular uses (involving marketing, 
increased sales, etc.).  Similarly, the Court in Sorrell was troubled by the fact that the statute 
restricted the disclosure of prescriber information under certain circumstances (marketing) but 
maintained an exception for purposes of research and education.  The inequality of restricting 
supported the Court’s finding that the statute was a content-based and speaker-based restriction 
on commercial speech.  Had the statute had no preference or care who was utilizing the speech 
and just restricted it all together, the statute may have had a better chance of survival.  This 
decision strikes at the heart of the dichotomy between protecting consumers from potential 
abuses of their information privacy, and the desired benefits of a free-flowing line of 
communication between patients and health care professionals, as well as, health care 
professionals amongst one another.  The Court’s intimated open mind towards future legislation 
is another reason why a reformed federal regulatory framework is most likely the best solution 
for the current flaws in consumer privacy protection.  It will prove to be wise to provide strict 
protection to consumer information at the outset until the technology improves and can be more 
properly governed.  Erring on the side of protecting the industries that profit tremendously from 
the dissemination of such information will make it more difficult to legislate in the future.  
Technology in general is evolving by the second and the potential harms outweigh the potential 
benefits if the technology is not reined in early.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 The computerization of health records and consumer data should have a positive 
influence on the health care industry.  Doctors should have a higher quantity of health 
information in front of them when seeing a patient and the information should be much more 
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detailed because of the ability to accumulate and transmit that information from patient to 
physician, as well as, between physicians and specialists.  However, technology and those that 
reap profits from the fast-paced technological advances are usually a step ahead of the law. 
 The privacy of medical records is currently regulated by the Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  While HIPAA does not provide a private right of 
action for patients, it imposes national standards to protect individuals’ medical records and other 
personal health information and applies to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and those 
health care providers that conduct certain health care transactions electronically.  The Privacy 
Rule requires appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of personal health information (PHI), 
and sets limits and conditions on the uses and disclosures that may be made of such information 
without patient authorization. The Rule also gives patients rights over their health information, 
including rights to examine and obtain a copy of their health records, and to request corrections.  
However, the restrictions on PHI only apply to “covered entities”.  Data brokers, data miners and 
reputational intermediaries do not qualify as covered entities; therefore, they are not governed by 
the restrictions of HIPAA.  Thus, the secondary market for patient’s PHI has exploded in recent 
years.  Often, patients have no knowledge that massive profiles of data have been acquired 
throughout their lifetime, and those profiles are often sold, disseminated and could be used to re-
identify the patient based on the prescription history, internet browsing, grocery shopping and 
other consumer information that companies have accumulated. 
 In addition to HIPAA, the FTC has the authority to regulate under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA).  According to the act, consumers must be notified if information in their 
file is used against them to deny an application for credit, employment, or insurance and must 
supply the consumer with the name, address and telephone number of the agency that provided 
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the information.  Commercial data brokers, however, are not subject to the limitations of the 
FCRA, as they are not considered credit-reporting agencies.  Therefore, the limited rights 
consumers have under the Fair Credit Reporting Act are virtually non-existent when dealing with 
the privacy issue presented by the secondary market causing concern for health professionals 
everywhere.  The FTC has taken a greater interest in reigning in the industry in recent years.  
They have filed complaints against reputational intermediaries like IntelliScripts and recently 
demanded reports from 9 data brokerage firms in an attempt to increase transparency and 
consumer awareness. 
